

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 PARIS 02315 01 OF 05 251014Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----251017Z 034781 /13
P 251002Z JAN 77
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9083

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 02315

EXDIS

FOR SECRETARY VANCE FROM AMBASSADOR RUSH

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, FR, US
SUBJECT: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FRANCE

1. THE TRANSITION PERIOD PROVIDED A USEFUL OPPORTUNITY FOR ME TO TAKE A HARD LOOK AT US-FRENCH RELATIONS WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF IMPROVING OUR ABILITY TO UPHOLD AMERICAN INTERESTS HERE AND IN EUROPE. I THEREFORE ASKED MY SENIOR STAFF TO QUESTION ALL OF OUR BASIC PREMISES ABOUT FRANCE AND TO ASSIST ME IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOME DETAILED CONCLUSIONS. THESE WILL BE TRANSMITTED IN DEPTH TO THE WORKING LEVELS OF THE DEPARTMENT. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO PRESENT MY SYNTHESIS TO YOU IN THE FORM OF MY OWN BASIC POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS PRIOR TO MY IMPENDING EARLY DEPARTURE FROM THE PARIS MISSION.

2. THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP

THE WASHINGTON-PARIS AXIS IS FUNCTIONING VERY WELL AT THE PRESENT TIME, AND THERE IS EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT IT WILL CONTINUE THE IMPROVEMENT THAT BEGAN IN 1974 AT MARTINIQUE. THE FOLLOWING TECHNIQUES WILL,

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 PARIS 02315 01 OF 05 251014Z

IN MY OPINION, BE USEFUL IN KEEPING THE BILATERAL CHANNEL WORKING TO OUR ADVANTAGE.

A. EMPHASIZE BILATERAL PERSONAL CONTACTS -- WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE VALUE OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS TO THE FRENCH LEADERSHIP, FROM GISCARD ON DOWN. RECENT EXPERIENCE, ESPECIALLY IN THE FORD-GISCARD RELATIONSHIP,

HAS SHOWN THAT GOOD PERSONAL CHEMISTRY CAN HELP US MAKE PROGRESS AND BREAK THROUGH LOGJAMS WHEN THEY DEVELOP. WE HAVE SEEN A NUMBER OF CASES WHERE POOR PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS HAVE PLUNGED SPECIFIC FRENCH BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS INTO STAGNATION. CANADA AND ALGERIA ARE PROBABLY THE MOST NOTABLE CURRENT EXAMPLES. TO AVOID THIS, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO CONSULT REGULARLY -- AND WHENEVER POSSIBLE IN ADVANCE. IN THIS CONTEXT, I WOULD HOPE THAT YOU WILL TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE EXPERTISE, KNOWLEDGE AND CONTACTS AVAILABLE THROUGH THE TRADITIONAL CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION BOTH IN PARIS AND WASHINGTON.

B. AVOID PUBLIC POLEMICS AND ATTACKS AND KEEP DIFFERENCES MUTED -- A HIGHLY DESTRUCTIVE FORCE IN FRENCH POLITICAL LIFE CONTINUES TO BE AN EMOTIONAL NATIONALISM THAT WILL SERVE AS A NEGATIVE MEMORIAL TO DE GAULLE FOR MANY YEARS TO COME. AS YOU KNOW, UNDER DE GAULLE AND POMPIDOU THIS EMOTIONAL NATIONALISM WAS INFLAMED AND INTENSIFIED, OFTEN FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL PURPOSES, BY PUBLIC ATTACKS ON MANY UNITED STATES POLICIES AS BEING IMPERIALISTIC AND THREATENING THE INDEPENDENCE OF FRANCE. THE HIGHLY PUBLICIZED CONFRONTATION BETWEEN SECRETARY KISSINGER AND FOREIGN MINISTER JOBERT AT THE WASHINGTON ENERGY CONFERENCE IN THE SPRING OF 1974, WHICH RESULTED IN JOBERT'S BECOMING A TEMPORARY NATIONAL HERO IN FRANCE, IS A RELATIVELY RECENT DEMONSTRATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF THESE TACTICS.

DURING MY FIRST MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 PARIS 02315 01 OF 05 251014Z

SAUVAGNARGUES SHORTLY AFTER MY ARRIVAL IN PARIS IN LATE 1974, I FOUND THAT HE AND GISCARD WERE FULLY COGNIZANT OF THE BAD EFFECT CREATED BY THESE TACTICS AND OF THE NEED TO DISCONTINUE THEM IF OUR RELATIONS WERE TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED. PRESIDENT FORD AND SECRETARY KISSINGER WERE OF THE SAME VIEW. SINCE THEN, BOTH SIDES HAVE MADE A CONSCIOUS EFFORT TO AVOID THESE PUBLIC POLEMICS AND ATTACKS ON THE ACTIONS AND MOTIVES OF THE OTHER, TO MUTE PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF DIFFERENCES, AND TO AVOID INFLAMING PUBLIC OPINION OF ONE COUNTRY AGAINST ANOTHER FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES OR OTHERWISE. FOR EXAMPLE, DESPITE THE HIGH FINANCIAL AND OTHER STAKES INVOLVED, THERE WERE NO OFFICIAL ATTACKS BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ON THE MOTIVES OR TACTICS OF THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE U.S. PLANE, THE F-16, HAD WON THE BITTERLY FOUGHT CONTEST

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 PARIS 02315 02 OF 05 251021Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----251026Z 034847 /13

P 251002Z JAN 77
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9084

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 05 PARIS 02315

EXDIS

WITH THE FRENCH MIRAGE FOR SUPPLYING THE CONSORTIUM OF BELGIUM, HOLLAND, DENMARK AND NORWAY. THE SAME HAS BEEN TRUE WITH REGARD TO OTHER HIGHLY EMOTIONAL ISSUES, SUCH AS INABILITY OF THE CONCORDE THUS FAR TO SECURE LANDING RIGHTS IN NEW YORK, AND THE RECENT ACTION OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN INCREASING THE DUTY ON COGNAC. IN TURN, THIS NEW POLICY HAS NATURALLY CREATED A PUBLIC RELATIONS ATMOSPHERE WHICH MAKES POSSIBLE A BETTER SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS THROUGH MUTUAL ACCOMMODATION. IT WOULD, OF COURSE, BE DIFFICULT TO CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THE BETTER RELATIONS THAT NOW EXIST BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES UNLESS WE CONTINUE THIS MUTUAL RESTRAINT.

C. TREAT FRANCE AS AN ALLY AND EQUAL AND BE RECEPTIVE TO FRENCH INITIATIVES -- HAVING ACCEPTED FRANCE'S MIDDLE-POWER STATUS, MOST FRENCH PEOPLE WANT THEIR GOVERNMENT TO ENTERTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN IS A POPULAR ANTIPATHY TO THEIR GOVERNMENT'S ACCEPTING SUGGESTIONS FROM FOREIGN COUNTERPARTS, PARTICULARLY THE UNITED STATES, THAT LOOK LIKE DIRECTIVES. STATEMENTS BY HIGH UNITED STATES OFFICIALS TO THE EFFECT THAT WE HAVE GLOBAL INTERESTS WHILE OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES HAVE ONLY REGIONAL INTERESTS, OR THE POSING BY HIGH US OFFICIALS OF SUCH QUESTIONS AS, "IF WE DON'T LEAD, WHO CAN?" ARE BITTERLY RESENTED AND
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 PARIS 02315 02 OF 05 251021Z

MISUNDERSTOOD.

ON THE BASIS OF MY EXPERIENCE HERE, I RECOMMEND TWO METHODS THAT HAVE HELPED US ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES AND IMPROVE RELATIONS. FIRST, WE SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR, BOTH BY WORDS AND ACTION, THAT WE ARE RECEPTIVE TO AND WELCOME FRENCH IDEAS AND INITIATIVES AND WILL GIVE THEM FULL AND FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION. SECONDLY, BEFORE WE LAUNCH ANY OF OUR OWN IDEAS AFFECTING FRANCE, WE SHOULD DISCUSS THEM WITH THE FRENCH FIRST AND INVITE THEM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE LAUNCHING. AN EXAMPLE OF FAILURE TO DO THIS WITH UNFORTUNATE RESULTS WAS OUR ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE YEAR OF EUROPE AND OF THE NEW ATLANTIC CHARTER BEFORE IT HAD BEEN FULLY EXPLAINED TO OUR ALLIES. THE FRENCH CONSIDERED THIS AN ATTEMPT BY US FURTHER TO DOMINATE EUROPE, AND THEIR RESULTING OPPOSITION WAS DISASTROUS FOR THE SUCCESS OF AN EXCELLENT CONCEPT. ON THE OTHER HAND, TWO EXAMPLES ILLUSTRATING THE VALUE OF THE USE OF THE ABOVE METHODS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

-- THE BITTER CONFRONTATION OVER THE I.E.A. CONCEPT WAS DIFFUSED AT MARTINIQUE IN 1974 WHEN PRESIDENT FORD AGREED THAT THE U.S. WOULD LEND SUPPORT TO PRESIDENT GISCARD'S PROPOSAL FOR A NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE. IN RETURN, GISCARD AGREED TO QUIET COOPERATION WITH THE I.E.A.

-- BY ACCEPTING PRESIDENT GISCARD'S INVITATION TO THE RAMBOUILLET ECONOMIC SUMMIT IN 1975, WE WERE ABLE TO DIFFUSE, ON A HIGHLY SATISFACTORY BASIS, A STRONG DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE FRENCH OVER FLOATING EXCHANGE RATES AND GOLD. AT THE SAME TIME, WHAT THE FRENCH CONSIDERED AS OUR AGREEMENT NOT TO MANIPULATE THE DOLLAR FOR UNFAIR TRADE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 PARIS 02315 02 OF 05 251021Z

ADVANTAGES, WHICH IN FACT WE HAD NOT BEEN DOING, WAS LOOKED UPON AS A SIGNAL FRENCH VICTORY AND PRESIDENT GISCARD ACHIEVED WIDE ACCLAIM IN FRANCE FOR A HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL CONFERENCE. IF THE CONFERENCE HAD BEEN OUR INITIATIVE AND HAD BEEN HELD IN WASHINGTON, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR GISCARD TO HAVE MADE THESE SAME CONCESSIONS ON EXCHANGE RATES AND GOLD, AND THE CONFERENCE WOULD NOT, IN MY OPINION, HAVE SUCCEEDED.

3. EUROPE

IT IS NEVER EASY FOR THE UNITED STATES TO STRIKE
THE PROPER NOTE WITH RESPECT TO THE INTEGRATION OF
EUROPE. IF WE ARE TOO ENTHUSIASTIC, WE ARE ACCUSED OF
SEEKING TO DOMINATE. IF WE ARE TOO PASSIVE, WE ARE
ACCUSED OF FAILING TO PROVIDE THE APPROPRIATE IMPETUS.
FRENCH OPINION ON THIS SUBJECT RUNS THE ENTIRE GAMUT FROM
PARANOIA TO SCHIZOPHRENIA. IT MAY BE A NO-WIN SITUATION,
BUT THE FOLLOWING GROUND RULES MAY BE HELPFUL:

A. WE SHOULD NEVER TRY TO DEFINE THE US RELATIONSHIP TO

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 PARIS 02315 03 OF 05 251024Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----251027Z 034872 /13
P 251002Z JAN 77
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9085

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 05 PARIS 02315

EXDIS

EUROPE UNILATERALLY. THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN
MAKING THE "YEAR OF EUROPE" EXERCISE SO UNSUCCESSFUL.
WE SHOULD ASSURE THE FRENCH AND THE EUROPEANS THAT THE
NEW ADMINISTRATION HAS NO INTENTION OF TRYING TO IMPOSE
ANOTHER MADE-IN-AMERICA GRAND DESIGN.

B. WE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ISSUES ARE
HIGHLY POLITICIZED, AND THAT OUR HANDLING OF US-EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE ONLY
ON TECHNICAL LEVELS. WE MUST CRANK IN APPROPRIATE
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS AT ALL TIMES.

C. AS A GENERAL CONCEPT, OUR VISIBLE SUPPORT FOR EUROPE
CAN PROBABLY BE DEMONSTRATED MORE USEFULLY IN AREAS WHERE
PRAGMATIC COOPERATION IS POSSIBLE, SUCH AS SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE AND EVEN SOME MILITARY SECTORS.

D. THE WAY TO PERSUADE THE FRENCH THAT WE ARE NEITHER

TOO PUSHY NOR TOO INDIFFERENT TOWARD EUROPE IS TO EMPHASIZE THE BILATERAL US-FRENCH RELATIONSHIP SO AS TO MINIMIZE MISUNDERSTANDINGS AT ALL TIMES. WE SHOULD ALSO MAKE SURE THAT IN ADDITION TO THE US RELATIONSHIP TO THE EC-9 PRESIDENCY, WE DO NOT NEGLECT OTHER CHANNELS SUCH AS THE FOUR-POWER, NATO AND OECD, ALL OF WHICH PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES TO TAKE VARIED POLITICAL SENSIBILITIES INTO SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 PARIS 02315 03 OF 05 251024Z

ACCOUNT.

4. ECONOMIC SENSITIVITY

A. FRENCH SENSE OF ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE

PERHAPS THE MOST INTERESTING PHENOMENON OF THE PAST SIX MONTHS IS WHAT I WOULD CALL THE ACCEPTANCE OF ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT AT ANY TIME SINCE THE EARLY 1950'S HAVE THE FRENCH SO READILY ACCEPTED THE REALITY OF THEIR UNBREAKABLE LINK TO THE US ECONOMY. IT ISN'T EASY FOR FRENCH POLITICAL LEADERS TO TELL THEIR PEOPLE THAT THEIR ECONOMIC FUTURE DEPENDS TO AN UNAVOIDABLE EXTENT ON DECISIONS MADE IN WASHINGTON. BUT THIS IS WHAT HAS BEEN HAPPENING HERE SINCE LAST SUMMER. IT SEEMS TO ME, THEREFORE, THAT WE SHOULD TAKE THIS PHENOMENON INTO ACCOUNT IN ALL OF OUR ECONOMIC THINKING, DECISION-MAKING AND PRONOUNCEMENTS. THE US COUNTERPART TO THE FRENCH ACCEPTANCE OF ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE SHOULD BE AN ENHANCED USG SENSIBILITY TO FRENCH AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONCERNS. I BELIEVE WE WILL BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE ENHANCED COORDINATION OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES IF WE CONSISTENTLY DEMONSTRATE CONSIDERATION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF OUR OWN ECONOMIC POLICY DECISIONS. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, WE SHOULD NEVER LOSE SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THE COHESION OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES DEPENDS TO A GREAT EXTENT ON THE ECONOMIC STABILITY OF COUNTRIES SUCH AS FRANCE.

B. NEAR-TERM PROSPECTS FOR FRENCH ECONOMY

SUCH CONSIDERATION WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN COMING WEEKS, FOR EFFORTS UNDER THE BARRE PLAN TO STABILIZE THE ECONOMY AND TO SET THE STAGE FOR MORE BALANCED GROWTH IN 1978 ARE ENTERING A CRITICAL PHASE, MARKED BY AN ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN, CONTINUED INFLATION AND SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 PARIS 02315 03 OF 05 251024Z

HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PRESSURES. THE FIRST POSITIVE RESULTS OF THE BARRE PLAN ARE UNLIKELY TO BE REALIZED UNTIL THE SECOND HALF OF THIS YEAR. MEANWHILE, THE POSSIBILITY OF A SERIOUS DEPRECIATION OF THE FRANC WHICH COULD ABORT THE CURRENT PROGRAM IS A MAJOR CONCERN OF GOF OFFICIALS. THIS IS WHY THE GOF HOPES FOR EXPANSIONARY POLICIES BY THE U.S., AND WHY PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING HAS ATTACHED CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO AN ECONOMIC SUMMIT MEETING IN THE SPRING. THUS, CONTINUITY OF THE CLOSE AND CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS ON ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS INITIATED FOLLOWING THE RAMBOUILLET AGREEMENT WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN THE COMING MONTHS; AND GOF INITIATIVES IN THIS RESPECT SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED.

D. KEEP LOW PROFILE AND HIGH LEVEL OF UNDERSTANDING

IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT WE REDUCE OPPORTUNITIES FOR FRENCH AND EUROPEAN POLITICAL OBSERVERS TO CATEGORIZE UNITED STATES ACTIONS AS "ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM." ANY PROVOCATIVE PUBLIC STATEMENTS FROM WASHINGTON ABOUT THE MTN AND THE CAP AT A TIME WHEN EUROPE IS INCREASING ITS AGRICULTURAL TRADE DEFICIT WITH THE U.S., OR ACTIONS

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 PARIS 02315 04 OF 05 251030Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----251032Z 034940 /13

P 251002Z JAN 77
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9086

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 05 PARIS 02315

EXDIS

UNDER THE TRADE ACT WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED AS HARBINGERS OF A RETURN TO PROTECTIONISM, WOULD CERTAINLY BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. IT WOULD ALSO PAY DIVIDENDS, I BELIEVE, IF IN EARLY 1977 WE COULD DEMONSTRATE OUR

DESIRE TO JOIN FRANCE IN AN EFFORT TO BRING THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION IN VIEW OF THE SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL CAPITAL GISCARD AND OTHER EUROPEANS HAVE INVESTED IN THIS EXERCISE. LAST, BUT BY NO MEANS LEAST IN THIS CATEGORY OF PROBLEMS, IS THE QUESTION OF LANDING RIGHTS FOR CONCORDE. I AM SURE THAT YOU ARE ALREADY AWARE OF THE GREAT EMOTIONALISM SURROUNDING THIS ISSUE AND ITS CAPACITY TO POISON THE FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP ACROSS THE BOARD IF THE FOREIGN POLICY ELEMENT IS NOT FACTORED IN AT EVERY STAGE.

5. INTERNAL FRENCH POLITICS

THE PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT MAY POSE A GREATER CHALLENGE TO THE INCOMING U.S. ADMINISTRATION THAN THE OUTGOING FOR THE SIMPLE REASONS THAT THE REALITY MAY REPLACE THE HYPOTHESIS WITHIN THE NEXT FIFTEEN MONTHS. BEGINNING WITH THE PREMISE THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO CONSIDER COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN NATO GOVERNMENTS AS INIMICAL TO OUR SECURITY AND THEREFORE UNDESIRABLE, I BELIEVE WE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 PARIS 02315 04 OF 05 251030Z

CAN BEST PROTECT OUR INTERESTS BY OBSERVING THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES FOR FRANCE.

A. AS MAURICE SCHUMANN REMINDED ME A FEW WEEKS AGO, WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW THE REAL ISSUE OF THE COMMUNIST DANGER TO BE OBSCURED IN THE MINDS OF FRENCH VOTERS BY THE ARTIFICIAL ISSUE OF USG INTERFERENCE IN FRENCH INTERNAL POLITICS. THE MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR KEEPING THE FRENCH VOTERS CONSCIOUS OF THIS ISSUE THEREFORE BELONGS TO THE CURRENT GOVERNING COALITION. TO THE EXTENT THAT WE CAN MAKE A CONTRIBUTION, IT SHOULD BE SUBTLE AND INDIRECT, WITH AN EMPHASIS ON APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PRESS RATHER THAN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

B. IF THE LEFT COMES TO POWER IN FRANCE, THE COMMUNISTS WILL BE THE JUNIOR PARTNERS IN THE COALITION WITH THE SOCIALISTS. THE BASIC CONTRADICTIONS IN THE SOCIALIST-COMMUNIST ALLIANCE ARE LIKELY TO BECOME IRREPRESSIBLE AFTER THE NEXT LEGISLATIVE ELECTION REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME. IN OTHER WORDS, IF THE LEFT COMES TO POWER, THE GAME IS NOT LOST FOR US, BUT ONLY BEGUN. I BELIEVE, THEREFORE, THAT OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST PARTY AT ALL LEVELS SHOULD NOT ONLY BE CONTINUED BUT INTENSIFIED AS THEY PREPARE TO GOVERN FRANCE. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND SHOULD BE RECEIVED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IF HE VISITS THE UNITED

STATES IN THE COMING MONTHS.

C. AS FAR AS THE COMMUNISTS ARE CONCERNED, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD GIVE THE VOTERS THE WRONG SIGNAL BY DEVELOPING NORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE PCF. WE CAN AND SHOULD CONTINUE THE PRESENT POLICY OF KEEPING OUR DOOR OPEN TO WORKING-LEVEL CONTACTS WITH ELECTED OFFICIALS, JOURNALISTS AND OTHER PCF MEMBERS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT OUR DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 PARIS 02315 04 OF 05 251030Z

FRANCE IS ALL-EMBRACING. IN MY OPINION IT WOULD BE SELF-DEFEATING FOR US, HOWEVER, TO ALLOW PCF GENERAL SECRETARY GEORGE MARCHAIS OR HIS PRINCIPAL LIEUTENANTS TO BE RECEIVED BY HIGH USG OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON OR PARIS.

D. BEYOND THE LEFT VS. RIGHT PROBLEM, I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD NOT VIEW THE 1978 ELECTION AS THE END OF A STRUGGLE THAT WILL DETERMINE THE FINAL VICTORY OR DEFEAT OF DEMOCRACY IN FRANCE. THE 1978 LEGISLATIVE BATTLE MAY VERY WELL TURN OUT TO BE INDECISIVE, WITH ANOTHER ELECTION FOLLOWING WITHIN A YEAR OR EIGHTEEN MONTHS. WHATEVER THE RESULT, WE SHOULD REGARD THE ELECTION AS PART OF A LONGER PROCESS THROUGH WHICH THE FRENCH PEOPLE ARE MOVING FROM THE GAULLIST ERA TO A NEW ERA OF VAGUELY DEFINED SOCIAL DEMOCRACY. OUR PATIENCE AND QUIET SUPPORT TO DEMOCRATIC FORCES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE AISLE CAN ENCOURAGE THE EMERGENCE OF RULING COALITIONS THAT REFLECT WHAT I CONSIDER TO BE A DE FACTO MAJORITY OF MODERATION WITHIN THE FRENCH BODY POLITIC. IN THIS CONTEXT, MY EARLIER RECOMMENDATION THAT WE ALLOW FRANCE TO SHARE THE INTERNATIONAL LIMELIGHT FROM TIME TO TIME WOULD ALSO ENHANCE GISCARD'S LEADERSHIP IMAGE INTERNALLY, THEREBY STRENGTHENING HIS ABILITY TO WIN THE

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 PARIS 02315 05 OF 05 251031Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W

-----251034Z 034967 /13

P 251002Z JAN 77

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9087

S E C R E T SECTION 05 OF 05 PARIS 02315

EXDIS

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN 1978.

E. FINALLY, I FEEL THAT THE TIME IS NOW APPROPRIATE FOR THE USG TO REMOVE ITS PRINCIPAL FOCUS FROM THE FRENCH ELECTORAL PROCESS AND EMPHASIZE INSTEAD OUR CONCERN FOR THE FUTURE OF FRENCH FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY, NO MATTER WHO IS IN POWER EIGHTEEN MONTHS FROM NOW. THE STEADY GROWTH IN SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH LEADS ME TO CONCLUDE THAT WE ARE ENTERING A NEW PERIOD IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS THAT WILL BE CHARACTERIZED BY SMALLER MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. IN THIS CHANGED SITUATION, THERE CAN BE LESS OBJECTIVE TOLERANCE FOR THE TYPE OF INDEPENDENT POSTURE ASSUMED BY FRANCE SINCE 1958. FRENCH POLICY HAS INDEED RECOGNIZED THIS UNDER GISCARD, WHO HAS MOVED CLOSER TO THE MILITARY PART OF THE ALLIANCE IN THE LAST TWO YEARS. OUR OBJECTIVE DURING THE NEXT TWO YEARS SHOULD BE AN INTENSIFIED DIALOGUE WITH ALL POLITICAL ELEMENTS EXCEPT THE COMMUNISTS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT FRANCE MUST MOVE EVEN CLOSER IF THE ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY IS TO CONTINUE TO HAVE PRACTICAL VALIDITY. IN SHORT, THE WESTERN ALLIANCE IS INEXORABLY ARRIVING AT A THRESHOLD BEYOND WHICH IT WILL NO LONGER BE COMPATIBLE WITH FRANCE'S INTERNAL POLITICAL IMPERATIVE TO HAVE ONE FOOT IN AND ONE FOOT OUT. I WOULD NOT EXPECT FRANCE'S
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 PARIS 02315 05 OF 05 251031Z

RETURN TO THE NATO INTEGRATED COMMAND IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. WE WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE LIVING WITH THAT JUST AS THE FRENCH ACCEPTED BLACK JACK PERSHING'S AND WILSON'S REFUSAL TO INTEGRATE UNDER FRENCH COMMAND IN 1917. BUT I DO THINK WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS ALL FRENCH POLITICAL LEADERS TO BUILD NEW OPTIONS FOR FRANCE'S MILITARY AND POLITICAL COOPERATION WITH NATO.

6. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

THE FRENCH HAVE MOVED CONSIDERABLY CLOSER TO THE US ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ISSUES UNDER GISCARD. THE GOF NOW HAS A FIRM POLICY TO PREVENT THE EXPORT OF

SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES, AND TO INSIST ON APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS FOR THE EXPORT OF REACTORS AND THE PROVISION OF FULL FUEL CYCLE SERVICES. I BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR CONTINUED SUCCESS IN THIS CRUCIAL AREA:

A. THAT THE GOF IS NOT PERCEIVED BY THE FRENCH TO BE FOLLOWING USG DIRECTIVES;

B. THAT FRANCE IS ACCEPTED AS A VIABLE NUCLEAR INDUSTRIAL CENTER, CAPABLE OF CONTRIBUTING WELL FOUNDED TECHNOLOGIES AND OF MAINTAINING LONG-TERM INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION;

C. THAT CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS ARE BASED ON TIMELY AND FRANK EXCHANGES OF VIEWS; AND

D. THAT WE CONTINUE TO ADVOCATE THE CANCELLATION OF THE FRENCH REPROCESSING PLANT FOR PAKISTAN AS A WAY OF ASSISTING THE GOF TO DIVEST ITSELF OF ITS COMMITMENT.

7. CONCLUSIONS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 PARIS 02315 05 OF 05 251031Z

DESPITE A FRAGILE POLITICAL SYSTEM WHICH IS DEEPLY TROUBLED BY AN ELECTORATE THAT CONSISTENTLY DELIVERS TWENTY PERCENT OF ITS VOTE TO THE COMMUNIST PARTY, AND DESPITE A LATENT SENSE OF INFERIORITY IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD, FRANCE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AN ELEMENT OF POSITIVE STRENGTH AS WE CALCULATE THE WESTERN BALANCE SHEET. IN MY VIEW, FRANCE'S WILLINGNESS TO USE ITS CONSIDERABLE ASSETS TO UNDERTAKE GLOBAL INITIATIVES IN COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. MAKES HER OUR MOST VALUABLE ALLY FOR SOLVING EXTRA-EUROPEAN PROBLEMS. FOR BEYOND THE NUANCED POLICY DIFFERENCES THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT OFTEN DISPLAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA IN APPARENT COMPETITION WITH US, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT FRANCE IS AS DETERMINED AS WE TO PRESERVE WESTERN VALUES AND OUR SHARED CULTURAL HERITAGE. I BELIEVE, THEREFORE, THAT IF WE PLAY OUR CARDS RIGHT, WE CAN BRING FRANCE INTO CLOSER COORDINATION WITH PRESIDENT CARTER'S DESIGN FOR A MORE HUMANE, PROSPEROUS AND PEACEFUL WORLD ORDER.

RUSH

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 25-Jan-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977PARIS02315
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770026-0622
Format: TEL
From: PARIS
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770120/aaaaartq.tel
Line Count: 596
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: d86c9ed1-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 11
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 30-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3510867
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FRANCE
TAGS: PFOR, FR, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/d86c9ed1-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009